Social Interactions of Inauthentic and Authentic Being-with by Gianna Being and Time, by Martin Heidegger, aims at reigniting the search for the meaning of being. Or at least, how to properly go about doing so. For Heidegger, the meaning of being must be drawn from the meaning of our being, as the existence of a world of meaning is dependent on our interpretation. Along the way, he determines several existential traits of Dasein (humankind). He also creates a dichotomy of modes for Dasein: authentic and inauthentic. Though Heidegger attempts to refrain from creating an ethical push towards one or another, the language seems to infer, in many cases, that the mode of authenticity is better in that it is truly owned by the self and is more aware of the realities of existence. “In contrast to this, there is the possibility of a concern which does not so much leap in for the other as leap ahead of him in his existentiell potentiality-of-being not in order to take ‘care’ away from him, but rather to authentically give it back as such†(119). However, in other portions of the text, he seems to deny the separation as value-based. “Again, authentic as well as inauthentic understanding can be either genuine or not genuine†(141). One trait Heidegger believes to be a part of Dasein is Being-with, which simply means that Dasein must always identify itself[1] in the world in terms of other human beings. Inauthentic beings tend to construct their own identity in terms of how others act. They identify themselves in a way that is seemingly a definition by negation or by one’s roles. For instance, one may define themselves as a mother, a lawyer, or anti-establishment. Each of these definitions is only valid in terms of a relationship to other people. Heidegger identifies the tendency to impersonalize and adopt commonly held beliefs (or even purposely disavow them in a contrarian fashion) as the they-self. The they-self is imbedded in inauthentic Dasein. Instead of owning one’s own existence and thoughts, it adopts the consciousness of the masses and uses it like a scapegoat. They-self is clearly stated as an essential function of Dasein in inauthentic everydayness[2]. However, it is also stated that the they-self is also a part of the existence of an authentic Dasein. “Authentic being a self is not based on an exceptional state of the subject, detached from the they, but is an existentiell modification of the they as an essential existential†(126). Though the they may exist primordially in both modes of Dasein, the authentic self is able to separate itself from the they-self, thus owning its own identity and perhaps looking onto the they separately. Everyday Dasein seems to view other Dasein as objects that are merely present. It defines them in terms of their roles, as it does itself. Though Heidegger provides numerous examples for the relationships between Dasein in this inauthentic mode of everydayness, he does not provide a concise meaning to the types of interactions one in the mode of authentic Being-with would have with either other authentic Dasein or those self-identified as within the they. In addition, he does not clearly state how one might emerge from the they-self, and come to own one’s identity independent of commonly held belief and generic roles. To find Heidegger’s meaning amidst the confusing language and ambiguity, it is necessary to scour the text for answers and draw connections between places throughout the text. This includes an examination of the separation between authentic and inauthentic, everyday being-among-others, authentic Being-with, and a critical look at the way they interrelate with the they. Once adequate analysis has been done on these topics, one will be better able to conceive of authentic Being-with. Heidegger views the essence of Dasein in an anti-dualist way. Whereas Descartes and other philosophers had thought of humans as two substances somehow linked (i.e. body and soul), Heidegger views the essence of man as a singular entity that is an interpreting, temporal thing that is thrown into being complete with all its structures and the world. Heidegger sums up this view by stating, “the ‘substance’ of a human being is not spirit as the synthesis of body and soul; it is rather existence†(114). Despite being thrown into the world without having asked, Dasein is able to take ownership of its possibilities. However, it is important for Dasein to realize that these possibilities are limited, but that it can still own or “win†itself despite initial circumstances. Dasein in the authentic mode must not succumb to societal pressures, though this does not mean that Dasein in authenticity refuses to fall into the path that they push it towards, rather, it means that authentic Dasein must evaluate the correct path for itself. Everyday, inauthentic Dasein, on the other hand, tends to deindividuate itself, and identify itself in terms of others’ perceptions. This everyday Dasein does not “own†itself, as it places blame for inadequacy on its being thrown and believes its possibilities to be predetermined by circumstance. The (translated) language of Heidegger, if analyzed, does a good job of illustrating this. The term thrown implies that an object, from the onset, was projected by another. The term “fallingâ€, which everyday Dasein believes itself to be, implies that the object is perpetually out of control, and set upon a predetermined path. It is as if authentic Dasein was thrown, but has now landed and is free to move about its world, whereas inauthentic Dasein is still on its way down. Throughout this fall, inauthentic Dasein does not realize that it is going to hit the ground eventually, and with a loud thud! As the essential self of the inauthentic Dasein is an impersonal “they-self†which engages in “idle-talkâ€, the inauthentic Dasein pushes death onto an impersonal one, like in the statement “one dies in the endâ€. Thus, death is not fully realized by the individual as near and threatening. “In such talk, death is understood as an indeterminate something which first has to show up from somewhere, but right now is not yet present for oneself, and is thus no threat†(243). Inauthentic Dasein may still fear death, as it realizes that one dies, and that it is part of that group, but does not treat it like authentic Dasein, which anticipates death. Authentic Dasein understands that death is not something to be pushed ahead and ignored, but realizes its nearness to itself. It emerges from the they when authentically anticipating death, and owns its own possibility of death. “Dasein is authentically itself only insofar as it projects itself, as being-together with things taken care of and concernful being-with… primarily upon its ownmost potentiality-of-being, rather than upon the possibility of the they-self†(252). Authentic Dasein chooses to die. Not in a way that is characteristic of suicide, but in a way that realizes its imminence, and embraces it. “Becoming free for one’s own death in anticipation liberates one from one’s lostness in chance possibilities urging themselves upon us, so that the factical possibilities lying before the insuperable possibility [death] can first be authentically understood and chosen†(253). This realization of an individual death plays a key role in emerging from a collective they-self. Individualization of death makes one recognize that others, like itself, are facing an imminent end to their projection. This is essential in understanding how an authentic Dasein may act towards an other. “As the nonrelational possibility, death individualizes, but only, as the insuperable possibility, in order to make Dasein as being-with understand the potentialities-of-being of others†(253). Though a Dasein can interpret the death of another it terms of itself, as a living Dasein, it is much more difficult to understand this death in terms of the Dasein that has died. However, this is impossible, as no one can view another’s whole life in total. As such, death becomes “mine†and “mine†alone in relation to a Dasein’s self. So, although Dasein does not have the ability to truly realize what death means in terms of being-with others, in recognizing its own death, it is able to assume a similarity in the death of another Dasein, and thus empathize with its plight. The existential structure of Dasein that is Being-with speaks towards one Dasein’s presence in a world that is always shared with other beings that are like it. The ontological reality of these “others†is not to be put in question. For Heidegger, the presence of other Dasein is a fundamental structure of Dasein’s being. Thus, any discussion as to the proof of the reality of other people is tangential and stupidly turns a blind eye to the significance of the implications of his conclusions. Dasein, in everyday mode, views other Dasein in a manner in striking contrast to authentic Dasein. As an inauthentic, everyday Dasein, others, like the they-self of a Dasein, reach a status of nearly objective presence (126). The “others†are viewed as that which “work†is done for. A chair being made by a carpenter is understand to be made for someone else, and the wood that is processed into treated boards made by someone else. Everyday Being-with is characterized by “passing-one-another-by†and “not-mattering-to-one-another†in terms of concern. “These modes of being show the characteristics of inconspicuousness and obviousness which belong to everyday innerworldly Dasein-with of others, as well as to the handiness of useful things taken care of daily†(118). In the latter case, Dasein looks at others as “a projection of one’s own being toward oneself ‘into an other.’ The other is a duplicate of the self†(121). Though Heidegger does not expound much on the particulars of how Dasein in each mode might treat others, it is certainly worthy of speculation. Seeing other while embedded in the they-self, and thus not distinguishing oneself and not owned by the self, views other almost as it does objectively present beings. This can lead to a real problem in morality, though Heidegger wishes to steer away from such a discussion. Dasein views certain objectively present things as handy, or in the case of a “broken†or “useless†object, as conspicuous. Thus, a Dasein who views others as merely objectively present might use them as a tool with which to reach some end without regard to the person. Think of how different an employer might treat his employees in each mode. An inauthentic boss may not recognize others as projections of his own self, and in doing so, refuses to emphasize with their personal throwness and possibilities. He might be more inclined to treat his workers as machines simply to be used for the purpose of his own desires. A worker who is unable to work or refuses to obey the rules the employer has put in place for work may be viewed by this inauthentic employer as conspicuous or broken. Just as one treats a conspicuous object, the employer may choose to fix the employee or toss him out. However, most Dasein are not totally wrapped up in this view of others, and realize the similarity of other Dasein as needing certain things. The employer may give concessions in order to “fix†the conspicuous worker, just as a repairman would spend time fixing something objectively present. An authentic employer, while recognizing his own self’s similarity to his employees, may treat them differently. He may be more willing to sympathize with his workers, and grant them concessions not for his own gains, or to fix them, but because he understands their concerns. However, it may be that the authentic employer would act much in the same way that the inauthentic would, but with different motives. An authentic employer may fire employees, but not necessarily because he views them as broken, rather, because he wishes to aid their grasping of their ownself and take responsibility for their projection of possibilities and their actions. Heidegger mentions the concepts of leaping-in and leaping-ahead, and explicitly state that the authentic mode of Dasein is more capable of leaping-ahead (119). Leaping-in takes the task away from a Dasein and “disburdens†him of it. An authentic Dasein, having taken ownership of its own “potentiality-of-being†seeks not “to take ‘care’ away from him, but rather to authentically give it back as such†(119). Though it does not speak exactly to this idea, one is reminded of Lao Tzu’s aphorism “Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime.†While leaping-in, one removes the problem from another Dasein, allowing the Dasein to take comfort in the tasks completion. Still, this leads to a dependence of one Dasein to the leaper-inner, and creates a dominant relationship by the Dasein who has leapt in. In the context of Lao Tzu’s proverb, the fisherman, having not taught the other man to fish, has made the other man dependent on the fisherman’s ability to fish for sustenance. While leaping-ahead, one encourages the other Dasein to complete the task or resolve the problem, and helps him recognize his ability to do so through his own power, thus he “helps the other to become transparent to himself in his care and free for it†(119). It seems that in the contemporary world, one is surrounded by opportunities to have others leap-in. If the computer is broken, call Geek Squad. While the following trite examples barely scratch the surface of the overall meaning of leapin-in and ahead, they may aid in a better understanding of the concept through analogy. Perhaps an authentic Geek Squad employee, when visiting a customer’s home, would attempt to show the customer how to solve the problem on their own the next time it occurs, and thus let the customer take ownership of its care, in doing the job himself. This would be contrasted by the Geek Squad employee simply doing the job, and leaving without really communicating the problem or the means for a solution to the customer, making the customer continuously reliant on the support team (which is much better for business). Similarly, an inauthentic professor may chose to simply compile a lecture or presentation of facts for the students to memorize. By giving the students a study guide with all the answers already written on it, the professor has leapt-in for the students by taking care of the problem of understanding the material for them. All that remains is simply regurgitating the answers come test day. An authentic professor, on the other hand, may be more likely to not give easy answers, but instead challenge the students to come to their own understanding through a careful reading of the material (while still giving guidance). This allows the students, once an assessment of their work is completed, to take ownership in their success or failure. Leaping-ahead is summed up by Heidegger as allowing the other to be free in his or her self. “This authentic alliance first makes possible the proper kind of objectivity which frees the other for himself in his freedom†(119). In the former professor’s case, any in-class discussion (if encouraged) would probably lead to a lot of “idle-talk†between students. Heidegger essentially determines idle-talk about a subject to be about the language itself and not the things the words are supposed to stand in for. “One understands not so much the beings talked about; rather, one already only listens to what is spoken about as such†(162). As this type of talk loses the primordial meaning of the beings spoken about, it is communicated instead by what Heidegger calls gossiping and passing the word along. It is a “groundless†type of understanding. “Idle-talk, which everyone can snatch up, not only divests us of the task of genuine understanding, but develops an indifferent intelligibility for which nothing is closed off any longer†(163). It seems to be another way of “covering up†the primordial reality of the world and existence so as to convince the Dasein of a false reality. However, it is to be noted that everyday Dasein does not engage in this with a conscious effort to deceive others. Idle-talk seems to be the starting point of an authentic understanding, as all Dasein learns most things first from this skewed method of understanding. “All genuine understanding, interpreting and communication, rediscovery and new appropriation come about in it, out of it, and against it†(163). True discourse, on the other hand, is the authentic way to discuss beings in themselves. This type of authentic talk does not seek to cover up the subjects with what seems to be comparable to sophistry, but instead looks for existential realities and the world as it primordially is. Though idle-talk is how everyday Dasein often gathers information, it is not as if one spreads this information maliciously, in a hope to deceive other Dasein. It seems that with this characteristic of everyday social interaction, things in themselves are simply lost in the muddled averageness of the publicness of the they, which is “insensitive to every difference of level and genuineness†(124). Idle-talk convinces Dasein that everything is knowable, and hides which things one can have and does have a genuine understanding of. Thus, idle-talk not only covers up the true being of a being, it puts in its place a false definition which assures the Dasein that it knows what it is talking about. The they itself is an existential structure of Dasein that is of utmost importance in the understanding of how Dasein interacts socially. Everyday Dasein, which primarily defines itself in terms of the they (becoming a they-self), is “disburdened†by this structure. It does so by covering up the reality of the being of Dasein and the real being of innerworldly things. The primary covering up is the fact that each Dasein will experience a personal end of possibilities, which allows everyday Dasein to ignore the imminence of their death. The they takes away the being of individual Dasein. “It itself is not; the others have taken its being away from it†(122). The they then becomes despotic and controlling of the Dasein, as not only its own self is lost, but the self of others. The they seems like it would almost create a widespread bystander effect by all people, as a collective conscience would diffuse responsibility from each individual. It is like a hive mentality, only without an explicit common goal. The tastes, interests, and opinions of the they permeate one’s own interests in everyday Dasein. The they, being an existential of Dasein, is part of the constitution of authentic Dasein as well. “Authentic being a self is not based on an exceptional state of the subject, detached from the they; but is an existentiell modification of the they as an essential existential†(126). It is confusing to determine the exact relationship between authentic Dasein and the they, as in the aforementioned quotation, it is clear that authentic Dasein is not “detached from the they†(126). Despite this, it seems that authentic Dasein, being an owner of itself, probably understands the they for what it is and separates its thought from the they-think of the masses. When a Dasein is in the mode of authenticity, it would look inwardly for answers about its own being, and towards the things in themselves for answers about their being, as opposed to heeding the covering up and idle-talk of average understanding that falls short of reality. Now that an analysis of some of the features of both authentic and inauthentic Being-with has been completed, some interpretation can be drawn out of the way in which each mode of Dasein might view others and itself socially. As for the self, everyday, inauthentic Dasein seems to separate itself from others by differences in roles, tastes, and looks. Stephen Mulhall, in the Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and Time, sums this up nicely. Our usual sense of who we are, Heidegger claims, is purely a function of our sense of how we differ from others. We understand those differences either as something to be eliminated at all costs, thus taking conformity as our aim; or (perhaps less commonly) as something that must at all costs be emphasized and developed- a strategy which only appears to avoid conformity, since our goal is then to distinguish ourselves from others rather than to distinguish ourselves in some particular, independently valuable way, and so amounts to allowing others to determine (by negation) the way we live (33)[3]. Separation of the self within the they, then, is simply through arbitrary distinctions like specific tastes in music. Our interactions with others, in an inauthentic attempt to get to know someone, will probably start with an exploration of their tastes and interests. An authentic Dasein understands itself by taking ownership of its actions throughout the multiplicity of experiences in life. It understands its throwness, but owns it and all that follows from it. Authentic Dasein may then distinguish itself from others through this distinguishable “I†and the realization that these other Dasein were themselves thrown into separate circumstances. Their individual beings may be seen as different not because of their tastes, but their tastes are different because of their differing throwness. An authentic Dasein would probably interact with others and get to know them by attempted understanding of their point of view and the world in which they were thrown. Instead of disburdening the person by leaping-in for them, the authentic Dasein would attempt to leap-ahead of the other, in hopes of freeing their concept of self from the impersonal they that diffuses responsibility. The authentic Dasein seems like it itself would become a mouthpiece for “the call of conscience†for others, by encouraging them to understand their temporality and owning their own possibilities. It certainly seems like an authentic Dasein would probably be viewed as a jerk to those in the mode of everydayness. Just as feelings of anxiety are often pushed away by a Dasein in everydayness, so too would the authentic Dasein be. After all, it is much more comfortable to take away from personal responsibility. If one justifies their decisions based on circumstances, the self-esteem goes on unfettered. An authentic Dasein seems to look at the determinacy/free-will problem with a synthesis of the two. It understands that each Dasein is thrown, but takes ownership of this throwness and recognizes its own ability to choose its possibilities, though they are limited by their throwness. Inauthentic Dasein, on the other hand, may either comfort other inauthentic Dasein by covering up their personal responsibility, or chide them by emphasizing it without recognizing their limitation of possibility. It seems, however, that authenticity and inauthenticity, even in terms of social interaction, may be a difference not in action but in motivation. While both an inauthentic and authentic Dasein may say the same thing to another Dasein, the reasoning behind it may be different. For instance, everyday Dasein may say to another who has been fired, “It’s not all your fault, the company has been looking to cut costs for some time.†His motivation would be to comfort the person and take away responsibility, or “leap-in.†An authentic Dasein may say the same thing, but because it really understands that the fired employee was limited because of the employers need to cut costs. Particular language itself may be another distinction between authentic and inauthentic interaction. For instance, an everyday Dasein may say “I have to go to work now,†thus stating that it is somehow unable to choose between going to work and another possibility. An authentic Dasein may simply say, “I am going to work now,†thus stating that it is choosing to go to work, and owning its possibilities, while recognizing the existence of other possibilities. The ethical ramifications of an authentic and inauthentic view of others are denied by Heidegger, but seem present nonetheless. It boils down to what value one places in truth. If one believes that aiding others in a real understanding of the realities of their own being and the being of innerworldly things, while recognizing the limitations of their possibilities and thus their ability to choose, than an authentic approach is more morally valuable. If one believes that ignorance is bliss, and that by covering up the reality of being and disburdening an individual of responsibility by equating actions as determined by chance and circumstance, than an inauthentic approach is more morally valuable. If one can gain something by understanding the fleetingness of life, and that one’s end of possibility in general is imminent and inescapable, than an authentic approach is more morally valuable. If one can gain something by pushing death to the side, and living life with ignorance of the imminence of an end, than the inauthentic approach is more morally valuable. If one believes that pursuing a true understanding of existence independent of average, ambiguous definitions is necessary for a somehow more meaningful life, than the authentic approach is more morally valuable. If one believes that continued reliance on an incomplete understanding of being is necessary for a somehow happier life, than the inauthentic approach is more morally valuable. It seems that this discussion is, as Heidegger asserts, incomplete in terms of morality, as it becomes a question of the meaning of life, whether it be inauthentic tranquility, or authentic awareness. [1] I use “it†as a pronoun for Dasein simply as a means of saying both genders at once, and not to imply any inhuman sort of meaning. [2] I use inauthentic everydayness because authentic Dasein also engages in the mode of everydayness. Unless otherwise distinguished, the use of “everyday Dasein†will be meant in the sense of inauthenticity. [3] Mulhall, Stephen. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and Time. London: Routledge, 2005. Print.
